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My life as a vixen 
Morwenna Griffiths 
 
Introduction  
Isaiah Berlin’s influential essay, ‘The Hedgehog and the Fox’ suggests that there are 
two categories of thinkers (Berlin, 1969). Using an ancient Greek poetic fragment 
(‘The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing’), he suggests 
they can be divided into hedgehogs who view the world through the lens of a single 
defining idea and foxes, who draw on a wide variety of experiences and for whom the 
world cannot be boiled down to a single idea.  I am a fox – in fact, a vixen (perhaps 
not something that would have occurred to Berlin whose references are uniformly to 
males). Looking back on my intellectual history, I see that it is one in which my ideas 
have changed and emerged as I moved from one social context to another, 
collaborated with other people, taught in a range of institutions, and relished the 
challenge of coming to grips with unfamiliar ideas. I have never stopped learning 
from the very beginning of my career as an educator, when I was an untrained 
volunteer in a socially disadvantaged primary school, to my current position as a 
professor of education at Edinburgh University.  The longer I continue in education, 
the more I realise the need to go on developing my practices and my understanding. I 
still wonder what to do for the best. I keep on making mistakes (new ones!), and I 
keep on learning from them. I think I understand more than I did. But I am still 
puzzled and perplexed by the ideas I encounter and am still thinking hard about how 
to deal with them.  
 
I had wondered how to tell the story of coming to my present understanding of what 
we educators do and should do. I did not want to write a linear, chronological 
autobiography in which it would be hard to avoid the familiar, fairy-tale genre of the 
narrator as hero (or tragic hero). That genre tells the story of the hero’s journey 
towards a worthwhile goal, how obstacles are overcome (or not) through 
determination, goodness and cleverness, usually with the help of a wise guide.  On the 
other hand I did not want to go to the other extreme of denying my agency altogether, 
with a story of my being merely a kind of witness of my own life, as I blundered 
about from one context and social structure to another.  Moreover, my ideas have not 
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developed in a neat linear progression but rather in a series of interweaving spirals 
from the changing circumstances of my life.  
I am particularly conscious of the complexities of autobiographical writing. I have 
written a lot about personal narrative, and have used personal narrative in a range of 
my work, philosophical and other. I find it theoretically unsatisfactory just to use a 
straightforward, linear, biographical approach. In what follows, I have constructed a 
mix of narrative approaches. There are some – sometimes parallel – chronological 
descriptions. These are punctuated by examples of particular issues that have engaged 
my attention. Each one has been connected to one example of the circumstances in 
which these issues have developed. That is, the examples demonstrate a mixture of 
agency and structure. The issues that have come to matter to me are behind the agency 
exercised in continuing to address them. The issues I focus on are (in no particular 
order) (1) social justice, (2) feminism, (3) relational selves and (4) reflective practice 
through personal narrative.  The circumstances in which they arise are one aspect of 
the structures which have constrained, facilitated and constructed my approach to and 
understanding of those issues. The ones I present as particularly significant are (again, 
in no particular order) (a) migrations, (b) openness to happenstance, (c) dialogue of 
various kinds, and (d) teaching. Other versions – and other examples – of my 
autobiography in relation to ideas can be found in Griffiths (1995, 1998b, 1999, 
2012a, 2013). 
 
First chronological description: A life on the move 
I was born in Tanganyika, now part of Tanzania. I lived there until I was ten. My 
father was a colonial administrator, so every two years he had a ‘long leave’ when we 
would visit South Africa and the UK for some months, after which he would be 
moved to a new posting, and we would all move house. The UK was a foreign 
country. My two brothers and I had all been born in Tanzania, my parents were both 
born in South Africa, and one grandparent was born in India because my great-
grandfather was a soldier in the British army. Most of our closer family of 
grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins lived half a continent away in South Africa. 
However my parents did not want to return to apartheid South Africa so when my 
father retired aged 50, we went to England where I had some great aunts and uncles. 
My father found work there, and so did my mother who had been a physics teacher 
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before she married.  They ended up living in Kent for about six years and then my 
father got a job in Botswana, where my parents spent nearly a decade, before finally 
retiring to Oxford. By that time I was in my late twenties and had long left home.  
 
I come from a family of migrating teachers, ministers of religion and administrators. 
My own generation has continued to move. My two brothers live in Australia and we 
have first cousins in the USA and Botswana as well as in South Africa and the UK. In 
Tanganyika we all went to boarding schools from seven years old. The children of 
colonial administrators and of other expatriates had their own schools, separate from 
the local ones and boarding schools were the only option. Home was a happy place 
for me so boarding school may sound like a hardship. Seven seems so young to me 
now! But I loved going to boarding school in the primary years. I liked the school 
work and I liked having so many other children to play with.  
 
All my own immediate family has been scientifically educated with the exception of 
my anthropologically trained father. I was hopeless at languages or anything requiring 
deft handiwork but equally at home with the arts and the sciences. In the last couple 
of years at school we were required to specialise in one area of the curriculum. I hated 
dropping any of my favourite subjects. My scientific and book-loving mother 
explained that I could continue enjoying literature and history more easily than I 
could keep up physics or mathematics. That made sense to me. I was already, perhaps, 
developing as a ‘vixen’. I took physics and mathematics at A level and went on to get 
a physics degree at university in Bristol. Before plunging from a school immersion in 
science into a university one I took a break of a year, something that was fairly 
unusual at the time. I spent a few months as a volunteer teacher of six year olds in 
inner city Leicester, followed by a couple of months in Israel on a kibbutz and 
working in an old people’s home in Jerusalem, before having to leave when the 1967 
war broke out. I joined a UN work camp in Northern Greece, and stayed there for the 
rest of that year, working and travelling.  
 
After my first degree I stayed at Bristol University, gaining my PGCE1. (I was about 
to get married to a man living in Bristol.) Initially I had enrolled on the course with a 
view to becoming a secondary school physics teacher, but the programme began with 
a week observing in a primary school. From this and from memories of Leicester, it 
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became clear to me that primary teaching was more to my liking. For one thing, I 
could be less of a subject specialist. The university did not offer a Primary PGCE 
programme but they allowed me to continue under the guidance of the only primary 
specialist on the staff, Philip Gammage, who tutored me individually, with the help of 
his contacts in schools.  
 
Changes of direction and occupation have continued ever since. I got a job in a local 
primary school in Bristol, but wanted to teach somewhere less suburban. So I 
transferred to an inner-city school. At that point my marriage fell apart so I handed in 
my notice and took the opportunity to go travelling. Further changes followed. I 
ended up in Isfahan in Iran for two years where I taught English as a Foreign 
Language, first at an air-force school and then at Isfahan University. On my return, I 
was fortunate, in those better funded days, to get an SSRC2  grant to study full time 
for an M.Ed. specialising in philosophy and language. This was followed up by 
another SSRC grant which enabled me to continue on to a Ph.D. in Philosophy of 
Education. My career has continued to be punctuated by moves of institution and 
focus.  (I am lucky that my economist husband was employed as an international 
consultant, and so able to base his home in places that suited my job.) I was employed 
at Christ Church College of Higher Education in Canterbury for two years as a 
lecturer in philosophy of education and primary education, then at Oxford Polytechnic 
for four years as an education lecturer in schools and in Higher Education. That was 
followed by six years in Nottingham University as a lecturer in Equal Opportunities 
and Social Justice, ten years at Nottingham Trent University as a Professor of 
Educational Research, and now for the past seven years at Edinburgh University as 
Chair of Classroom Learning. 
 
First example: The issue of social justice in the context of migrations  
I use the term ‘migration’ to mean physical, social and intellectual movements. It is an 
adaptation of what Maria Lugones (1989) calls ‘“World”-traveling’. Lugones explains 
that by ‘world’ she does not mean anything imaginary. Rather it is a material and 
social association in which it is possible to dwell. However her ‘ “world”-traveling’ is 
between worlds which are all present at the same time, in contrast to my ‘migrations’ 
which include not only travel between different existing ‘worlds’  but also travel to 
‘worlds’ from which steps cannot be re-traced. Migrating has required me to adjust 
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and then re-adjust my understanding of myself, of norms of conduct and of the world 
at large: in short to adjust my lived theories of identity, ethics, ontology and 
epistemology. The ‘world’ may have since disappeared for everyone: Tanganyika is 
still there as part of Tanzania, but not the British-governed Tanganyika of my 
childhood.  Equally it may be that a new ‘world’ can make the old one disappear for 
ever for some people while it continues to exist for others. In my case, a pre-feminist 
understanding of gender relations is no longer a ‘world’ I can ever inhabit again.  
 
Migration has been hugely fruitful in my understanding of social justice. I focus on 
just one way in which migration has influenced my thinking in this regard: the 
significance of self-identity for self-esteem and for social justice. This only became 
apparent to me gradually.  My understanding of it began, I think, as I reflected on my 
developing responses to feminism and feminist theory. It was apparent to me that I 
did not quite fit with mainstream feminist theory of the time, any more than I fitted 
with mainstream philosophical theory. I explored some of this perception with a 
feminist philosopher colleague, Anne Seller, in a theoretical paper about the politics 
of identity (Griffiths and Seller, 1992). We discussed the ways that belonging to one 
social group and its associated norms of conduct could clash with belonging to 
another one – and explored the ways in which we both wanted and did not want to 
belong to various groups. I talked about having a liking for science at a time when 
much orthodox feminist theory was deeply suspicious of the largely male ‘world’ of 
scientists. We discussed the largely male ‘world’ of philosophy and its norms of 
conduct. 
 
At the time self-esteem was emerging as a significant concept in education. I 
reappraised earlier experiences. My increased understanding of what it was to migrate 
between ‘worlds’ meant that I did not take at face value a simplistic connection 
between individual self-esteem and achievement.  The correlation existed, in 
differential academic achievement by different social groups. But the reasons for it 
might not be the simple causative one that was put forward. I argued that the 
discomfort of not being able to meet several incoherent social norms simultaneously 
was a factor in self-esteem. Therefore teachers could promote higher self-esteem in 
their pupils through implementing inclusive practices for the class as a whole. 
Focusing on pupils’ individual self-esteem and individual achievement dealt with the 
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symptoms rather than causes of the problem. I continued exploring self-identity and 
self-esteem in relation to social justice in education in my book on identity (1995) and 
again in my collaborative books on social justice in education (Griffiths and Davies, 
1995 Griffiths, 2003) as well as in a number of articles.   
 
Second chronological description: Getting acquainted with philosophy and 
philosophy of education  
What starts an interest in philosophy? Indeed why is it that some children find 
enjoyment in something that other children find uninteresting or worse? Whatever the 
reason, I seem always to have been interested in logical argument, in abstractions and 
in the big questions about human lives. That said, as I look back now, and tell an 
autobiographical story in this article, I am reminded how unreliable memory is, and 
how, as a life unfolds, different incidents are told and retold with new interpretations 
and to new audiences. So I can tell of some occasions that seem to have been 
indicative and significant but I remain uncertain about their accuracy or importance.  
 
Like many very young children I was fascinated by abstractions (pace Piaget!): the 
logic behind numbers as well as the kinds of ideas presented to us by preachers. In my 
secondary school I liked all the classes which encouraged speculative or ethical 
thinking (Religious Education, mathematics, history, English). I joined the debating 
club but gave it up as it became clear to me that formal debates were all about 
competitive glory, a kind of jousting for prizes, with which I did not want to be 
associated. I loved the extra-curriculum discussions organised by the head teacher 
based on a radio programme about ideas. I was disappointed at university to discover 
that undergraduate physics seemed to be more about having enough understanding to 
predict events rather than reaching a more holistic understanding of the world. Or, 
more accurately, I saw that only the very best physicists were able to understand the 
world more holistically, and I would never be that good. At best I would become one 
who could work out the mathematics - but without knowing what it meant. I was one 
of the very few among the PGCE students who took an option in Philosophy of 
Education, and struggled to understand Paul Hirst’s transcendental argument about 
curriculum. As a young teacher I attended evening classes run by the Philosophy 
Department of the University. Probably the first book in philosophy that I tried to read 
and study was Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Inevitably I struggled, but I loved the 
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struggle and the discussions that the lecturer encouraged. Later, in the months waiting 
to begin the M.Ed., I attended evening classes run by Stefan Körner who introduced 
me to his theories of categorial frameworks and the philosophy of mathematics 
(Körner, 1970). I also avidly followed a television series of the time ‘Men of Ideas’, 
which featured 15 interviews with prominent philosophers who included just one 
woman, Iris Murdoch (Magee, 1978). 
 
I began my formal education in philosophy and philosophy of education on the M.Ed. 
My tutor, Gordon Reddiford, encouraged his students to read original works like 
Hume’s Treatise, Ryle’s Concept of Mind, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations and Kenny’s Action, Emotion and Will – as well as what was then 
orthodox Philosophy of Education, for instance, Hirst on knowledge, Peters on the 
education of the emotions, and Scheffler on reason. At the point that I had to choose a 
topic for doctoral studies in order to apply for funding to the SSRC I happened to be 
writing an essay on the education of emotions, and was finding it complex, difficult 
and interesting. So I chose that. Gordon helped me fill in the application form. I was 
puzzled about what to put under ‘methodology’: he wrote in for me, ‘Thinking’. My 
doctoral studies kept me thinking, as I read, discussed, puzzled, and listened. I audited 
undergraduate classes in philosophy and attended education graduate seminars in the 
education department and philosophy graduate seminars in the philosophy 
department.  
 
Second example: The issue of feminism in the context of being open to 
happenstance  
As with so many of my intellectual developments in philosophy and practice, my 
understanding of feminism has benefitted hugely from what feels like mere 
serendipity but which must also be attributed to an openness to happenstance: to 
treating happenstance as an encouragement to change direction, rather than as a 
hurdle to be negotiated within an already decided path. Feminist theory and 
philosophy have been central to my own development as a philosopher of education. 
My engagement with both has been influenced by such openness. As I have 
described, my early engagement with both philosophy and philosophy of education 
was not related to feminist ideas. That changed just as I was completing my doctoral 
thesis. My philosophical investigation of emotion had been largely based within 
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mainstream philosophy. As I was nearing completion, the question of how I might re-
think the education of emotion became more and more relevant. I had seen that one 
possibility would be to focus on issues of delinquency and deviance. That would have 
been enough. However at the same time some of my close friends from outside the 
academy were arguing about feminism in relation to their own lives. I was dismissive 
about the project of feminism. Wanting some evidence for my attitude I started to 
read further first in pyschology, and then in other subjects. I read, among others, 
Archer and Lloyd (1982) and Sayers (1982) on biology and gender, Spender (1980) 
on language, and Stanworth (1983) on pedagogy – and found, to my consternation, 
that the arguments for a feminist approach were not as I had assumed. I had, it 
seemed, been wrong. Involved as I was at the time with constructing philosophical, 
educational theory, I was set, irrevocably, on a path towards feminist philosophy. 
Gender became salient in the final chapters of the thesis and appeared not long after in 
publications about computers (e.g.  Griffiths, 1988). However, even more 
significantly, I had been introduced to a number of other feminists interested in 
philosophy or, to put it another way, to philosophers interested in feminism. I was 
fortunate therefore to be there when feminist ideas were discussed, new books were 
mentioned, and a range of philosophical approaches explored (see next section).   
 
Just as fortunately, I found myself in a position a year or so later to become a co-
editor of a book on feminist philosophy. A reading group for women in philosophy 
across England had been arranged in what was then a typically feminst way of doing 
things. It met irregularly for a day or two at the weekend. One of our number would 
agree to host it. Once it was Judith Hughes with Mary Midgely in Newcastle. Another 
time it was Margaret Whitford with Caroline Bailey in London. I organised some day 
events in London, with the help of Anne Seller and Alison Assiter. Somebody would 
suggest a theme, a reading or a discussion of work in progress. It might be a small 
informal discussion or part of a larger event. Sometimes we stayed overnight 
somewhere. On one Saturday the weather had been particularly awful, and transport 
links had been difficult.  Margaret Whitford and I were the only two to turn up. We 
duly discussed the reading. Then one of us suggested that our small group should put 
together an edited collection of essays, and so we did (Griffiths and Whitford, 1988). 
Margaret and I drew on very different traditions of philosophy; I had been introduced 
to the analytic tradition and was using it to investigate emotion, while she drew more 
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on the French theory, and was currently studying Luce Irigaray. The happenstance of 
this encounter presented the opportunity for me to engage with a set of completely 
new, unfamiliar and destabilizing ideas. I read Genevieve Lloyd’s The Man of Reason 
and re-thought my ideas about rationality.  Jean Bethke Elshtain’s Public Man, 
Private Woman introduced me to gender assumptions underlying mainstream political 
theory. Anne Seller explored the philosophical implications of arguments surrounding 
the women’s camp protesting about cruise missiles at Greenham Common (Seller, 
1985).  Irigaray’s This Sex which is Not One introduced me to new ways of engaging 
with psychoanalytic theory. I addressed these ideas in discussions with the rest of the 
group, radically changing the direction of my own thinking as I did so. Some of this 
appears for instance, in the dialogue I constructed with Richard Smith on dependence, 
independence and interdependence in educational practices (Griffiths and Smith, 
1989).  It can also be seen in my (1988) article ‘Strong feelings about computers’. 
 
Third chronological description: Ideas influenced by relations in philosophical 
and professional societies 
Very shortly after I finished my Ph.D., I met Joanna Hodge, a feminist and 
philosopher, who had just finished her own thesis on Heidegger. We thought it would 
be good to have a meeting for women in philosophy, but there were very few indeed 
that we could think of. I remember standing in a university library scanning the title 
pages of philosophy journals, trying to find any women’s names among the authors. 
(This was a time before Google!) Finally we identified a dozen women working in 
philosophy, and invited them to an informal meeting in Joanna’s college, St 
Catherine’s.3 Some of us formed the core of a group which began a series of semi-
formal weekend meetings where we presented work in progress or discussed books, 
as explained in the previous section, in connection with Margaret Whitford’s and my 
collection, Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy. Over some years the group gained 
members, some of them highly active, like Christine Battersby and Soren Reader, and 
it morphed into the Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP). The group also gave 
me a reference group of philosophers, mostly based in philosophy departments but 
also in adult education, French, and women’s studies. We have continued to meet, 
discuss books, argue and occasionally publish collaboratively ever since. In this group 
I was introduced to Irigaray, Heidegger, Arendt, Kierkegaard and other thinkers who 
supplemented my original grounding in Anglo-Saxon traditions of philosophy. My 
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reading in feminist theory was given an impetus, especially within the newly forming 
field of feminist philosophy. The collection, Discovering Reality, by Harding and 
Hintikka (1983) was inspiring for us, for instance, as were Donna Haraway’s (1985) 
article, ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs’ and Carole Pateman’s book, (1988) The Sexual 
Contract.  We read and discussed Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble when it first came 
out, and heard  Christine Battersby present early versions of what would become 
chapters in The Phenomenal Woman.  
 
In my first year of teaching in Canterbury I went to my first Philosophy of Education 
Society of Great Britain (PESGB) annual conference where I found myself making 
new philosophical connections with other philosophers of education and their ideas. I 
was excited to find myself sitting over breakfast with the authors of the books and 
papers I had read. Even more exciting was the chance to discuss the presentations 
with them and to hear what they were working on. As a result I began to respond to 
some of them in academic papers as well as in discussion. I strongly disagreed with 
Robin Barrow’s position on skills and wrote a response to his paper. A talk with 
Richard Smith about autonomy led to our paper on dependence. Wilf Carr was in the 
process of elaborating his theories of action research in relation to philosophy. 
Michael Fielding introduced me to the double edge of the concept of empowerment. 
All these, and other discussions, have influenced the direction and manner of my 
approach to philosophy of education.  
  
The membership elected me to the Executive committee several times, which gave me 
the opportunity to engage closely with mainstream philosophy of education, 
responding to the concerns of others in ways which then influenced how I developed 
ideas from other sources. Sometimes I am invited to contribute to seminar series 
which include philosophy of education. The directions of my thinking have been 
influenced by the formal exchanges in these seminars, but even more by the informal 
face-to-face discussions which they stimulate. Most recently, with the support of 
PESGB, I have organised a series of three annual seminars for women in philosophy 
of education at Edinburgh University. Again, the encounters have been personally 
very fruitful in the development of my own ideas in relation to those of others. 
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Throughout my career I have sporadically carried out empirical enquiries of various 
kinds. When I moved to Oxford I was introduced to a very lively group of staff, led 
by Sarah Tann, Kate Ashcroft and John Isaac, who were designing and implementing 
a teacher education programme founded on reflective practice. Through them I began 
to attend the British Educational Research Association (BERA) and to make links 
with the Collaborative (then Classroom) Action Research Network (CARN). As with 
PESGB, through BERA (and through election to its Executive committee) I was 
invited to collaborative enterprises, and got the opportunity for many fruitful face-to-
face discussions. While I was at Nottingham University, Jack Whitehead, who I had 
met through BERA and CARN, invited me to submit a paper to the first Self-Study in 
Teacher Education Practices (S-STEP) conference. Not knowing what ‘self-study’ 
was, but liking the look of the conference venue in Herstmonceux Castle in Sussex, I 
improvised a short paper on the theme of ‘know thyself’. It was a happy decision. 
Over the following decade, the Castle Conference, as it is known, gave me the chance 
to interact with a group of people developing lively and creative approaches to 
understanding ourselves as educators.  As a result, I expanded my empirical repertoire 
to include visual methods and investigations of collaboration. All of these fed back 
into my theoretical and abstract enquiries, integrating research methodologies and 
practices with philosophical perspectives and approaches (e.g. Griffiths, 1998a).  
 
Third example: The issue of relational selves in the context of dialogues  
By the term, ‘dialogues’ I refer to conversations and discussions preferably face-to-
face but sometimes also by phone or informal emails when all parties are on-line 
simultaneously. A dialogue may be backed up by written communications but these 
are only secondary. Entering into dialogue with others is risky. There is plenty of 
room for mutual misunderstanding and suspicion. There is also the likelihood that 
there are significant differences about what the different participants expect to gain. 
On the other hand, dialogues can lead to exciting and productive new perspectives on 
old approaches, both theoretically and in educational practice. Belonging, as I did, to 
a range of philosophical, empirical and professional education circles, I had the 
opportunity to have conversations and discussions with colleagues who did not share 
my perspectives and starting points. I found my assumptions and conclusions 
challenged and changed by these encounters. This has been energising and 
stimulating. As a result, perhaps, I have increasingly welcomed the chance to be part 
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of collaborative enterprises even when I think they do not fit my plans for future 
directions.  
 
One recent collaborative enterprise that did not seem to fit my plans has been helpful 
in furthering my understanding of the significance of understanding selves as 
relational. I had not expected this when I accepted an invitation from David Bridges 
to participate in two linked philosophy of education seminars funded by the Teaching 
and Learning Research Programme4 (TLRP) on epistemological perspectives on 
different educational research methods for policy; and then a year later, to be part of a 
Keynote Symposium at BERA on the relevance of philosophy of education for 
teaching, research and policy, in which I was asked to focus on policy. The common 
themes here were policy and the impact of educational research, including 
philosophical research on policy. Up until then I had paid little attention to policy as 
an academic focus of interest. I was far more interested in classroom and school-level 
education. However I found focus on policy and impact fruitful in extending ideas I 
had been working on since writing Feminisms and the Self in 1995. 
 
A number of dialogues were set in train. I worked closely with Gale Macleod, a 
colleague at Edinburgh to produce a contribution to the TLRP seminar. We talked for 
hours in the local coffee bars exploring our different perspectives on research, policy 
and narrative research. The seminars encouraged the ebb and flow of discussion 
which led to what Leslie Saunders describes as (2008, p.3): 
The power of the encounter: the dialogic way in which knowledge and 
understanding are created and developed, and become common property 
through principled debate.  
 After the keynote symposium, Gale and I continued our discussions about how 
philosophy might have an impact on policy. We began to look for opportunities to 
have conversations with philosophers who reported that they had made an impact and 
with policy makers who might have felt such an impact. As a result of all these 
conversations I wrote an article which argued for the significance of understanding 
the self as relational in determining how impact might be achieved (Griffiths, 2012b). 
The selves of philosophers and policy makers have been constructed in relation to 
their social and political positioning and this affects how they can and will relate to 
the other. I followed this article with another one which examined the issue from the 
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other side, investigating the significance of the policy context for selves of 
philosophers working within the policy contexts in which impact is so important 
(Griffiths, 2012c). I argue that the positionality of philosophers of education (their 
relation to) the policy context constrains who they can then become.  
 
Fourth chronological description: Ideas influenced by a working, teaching life  
Every time I have moved jobs, I have had to adjust to a new context of teaching – 
which is both practically and intellectually difficult. However, these difficulties have 
been a pleasure for my vixen-like self. My career has taken me from a suburban 
primary classroom to an inner-city problem school (contexts in which I first began to 
understand some of the complexities of pedagogical relations). My next moves into 
teaching English as a foreign language took me into a range of contexts: Iranian air-
force cadets, Iranian serving teachers, summer schools for various ages, students in 
college in England needing to improve their English, and individual tuition (contexts 
in which I developed an increased appreciation of the many ways of negotiating 
tensions arising from cultural and social difference). Then I began three decades in 
British Higher Education, as a lecturer in teacher education and in non-vocational 
education degrees, in both low and high status establishments, and as part of all that, 
occasionally teaching in various primary schools (contexts in which I was able to 
explore some of the intricacies to be found in reflective practices – whether termed 
‘self-study’, ‘action research’, or ‘reflective teaching’). 
 
Another pleasure for my vixen-like self has been the requirement to teach subjects 
about which I had not thought myself very knowledgeable, let alone expert. I have 
found myself learning (very quickly sometimes!) about a range of new areas. Even at 
the beginning of my career in primary schools, I was expected to teach crafts and 
games, in both of which I am no more than barely competent. Even when I have been 
given the – sadly rare – opportunity to teach courses in philosophy of education, it has 
more often than not been in areas which I had not previously investigated. Moreover, 
I regularly find that my students’ interests provoke me into investigating new areas. It 
was undergraduate students who encouraged me two decades ago to think more 
deeply about self-esteem. Knowing many things, as vixens do, means that connections 
can be made between them. Throughout my career, I have found that philosophy of 
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education and educational theory and practice are in a productive tension, so that each 
changes iteratively as a result of its relation to the other.  
  
Fourth example: The issue of reflective practice through personal narrative, in 
the context of teaching students  
Reflective practice is a phrase which is much bandied about in teacher education and 
within policy statements about the continuing professional development of teachers. It 
is made up of two words which any English speaker would understand, so perhaps it 
is not surprising that many people think it needs no explanation. However it is a 
technical term and there has been a great deal of intellectual effort expended in 
defining what it is and what it ought to be. I first encountered the idea in 1986 at 
Oxford Polytechnic, as I mentioned earlier, in a team keen to implement reflection.  
Our work drew on Dewey, Zeichner, Schön and Kemmis; we encouraged students to 
relate their personal experience to wider theories within the educational literature.  
We became interested in what it meant to articulate personal experience through 
narratives, metaphors and visual images. I began to encourage students to use 
autobiography in their assignments. 
 
The iterative process of moving from teaching to theorising and back to teaching was 
significant in how I constructed my book on identity, Feminisms and the Self in which 
I drew on the autobiographies of people from a range of ‘worlds’ to interrogate 
orthodox theories of the self.  The process of researching and writing the book fuelled 
my interest in personal narratives and how they could be used to re-think orthodox 
theories within social and political philosophy and theory. Drawing on Lyotard’s 
(1984) concept of ‘little stories’ in relation to ‘grand narratives’, I tentatively named 
this process ‘practical philosophy’ as it put the ‘little stories’ of a particular life with 
the abstractions associated with philosophy into tension with each other. More 
recently I theorised personal narrative in terms of an epistemology of the unique and 
particular (Griffiths and Macleod, 2008). This re-theorisation continues to inform my 
teaching. I encourage students to use ‘little stories’ and personal experience in their 
philosophical arguments. Teaching continues to inform my theorising as I have had to 
sharpen my own understanding in order to be very clear about the difference between 
personal experience used as a ‘little story’ and personal experience used as anecdote, 
journalism, advertising or rhetorical flourish.   
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Concluding thoughts 
A vixen never reaches a stopping point. There are always so many interesting things 
to explore and to learn. I am still thinking, still puzzled – and still making mistakes. 
Dialogues continue serendipitously as ever and, it seems, I am still open to 
happenstance. My interest in social justice and feminism remains strong, especially in 
relation to education and philosophy. I continue to investigate them through personal 
narrative, always alert to how my relational self, the ‘I’, is made up of many kinds of 
‘we’. Meanwhile I look forward to seeing what will come of my next migration into 
the new world of semi-retirement, and to the opportunities it affords for other forms 
of happenstance, to new dialogues while retaining the chance to teach new cohorts of 
education students.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 Postgraduate Certificate in Education – a year long course that provides the qualification needed to 
become a teacher in England.  
2
 Social Science Research Council, now the Economic and Social Research Council 
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3
 They were, to the best of my memory: Brenda Almond (then Brenda Cohen), Alison Assiter, Paula 
Boddington, Jean Grimshaw, Joanna Hodge, Judith Hughes, Kathleen Lennon, Mary Midgely, Onora 
O’Neill, Anne Seller, and Margaret Whitford. 
4
 The TLRP was a large scale programme of linked research projects funded by the British Government 
from 2000- 2012.  http://www.tlrp.org/index.html  
